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Introduction 
In 1820, a fanatical Bonapartist named Louvel 
assassinated an heir to the Bourbon throne, the Duke of 
Berry. The crime shocked the whole of France. More 
importantly, it symbolized the dividing line in the French 
Restoration, between the years 1814-1820, and 1820 until the 
overthrow of Charles X in 1830. Until 1820 it was hoped that 
France could reconcile her new constitution, her 
revolutionary legacy, and her ancient traditions and 
insititutions. After the Duke's death, France was burdened 
with two hostile factions, unwilling to compromise and 
moving toward opposite extremes.[!] 
The reaction to Louvel's crime was most severe among 
the royalists, those united by a fundamental belief in the 
monarchy. They perceived the assassination to be proof that 
the political opposition would stop at nothing to achieve 
its goals. Prominent among the royalists in condemning the 
act, and indicting its presumed liberal supporters, was the 
1. Guillaume de Bertier de Sauvigny, The Bourbon 
Restoration[Philadelphia: The University of Pennsylvania 
Press, 1966], pp.165-66. 
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eminent literary figure, Fran9ois Rene Viscount 
Chateaubriand (1768-1848). Though famous more for his 
literary successes, including the .Genius of Christianity and 
the novels Atala and Ren€, Chateaubriand in 1814 turned his 
writing to politics, and until 1820 labored to defend the 
Bourbon monarchy and the traditions of France which had been 
threatened by the Revolution of 1789, as well as the Charter 
which was born with the overthrow of Napoleonic government. 
He is in many ways a curious figure in the 
Restoration, a man dedicated to the monarchy, to religion, 
to a glorified French history in which wisdom, toleration 
and courage def.ined the Frenchman's life. Yet he also 
welcomed consititutional government in France in the form of 
I 
the Charter, and supported the idealism of the Revolution. 
He represented in his views the old and the new France, and 
for six years was confident that his theories could 
reconcile the two. 
It was an audacious goal he set for himself. He was 
not a systematic thinker, and trying to harmonize what were 
of ten contradictory theories of government made his work 
complex, sometimes simply confused. Yet even if he did not 
succeed in his task, his political writings became a record 
of the many opposing ideas with which the Restoration 
struggled. The benefit of returning to his major works lies 
first in understanding how one thinker of the period hoped 
to restore political order to France, and, second, 
understanding what were some of the major issues of the 
2 
day. 
Many historians have sought to place Chateaubriand in 
context with his time. It is a difficult task, for his 
ideas may be treated selectively, causing the reader to see 
him at one moment as a reactionary, at another as a moderate 
in support of constitutional government. In a sense, none 
of these interpretations are wrong: rather, they reveal the 
true Chateaubriand, who was comfortable with his eclectic 
vision. 
One historian, B.D.Gooch, wrote that he was a romantic 
and practical man, while "at the same time he was both 
Ultraroyalist and liberal."[2] Dominique Bagge called him 
an Ultra-royalist under a parliamentary banner, and that his 
major work, Le Monarchie selon la Charte, was beautiful but 
without conviction.[3] Louis XVIII's biographer, Philip 
Mansel, argued that he was a moderate politican who became a 
violent Ultra in 1815,[4] while Nora Hudson thought he 
adopted an intermediate position which incurred the 
criticism of the extremists.[5] And finally, one important 
2. B.D. Gooch,Europe in the Nineteenth Century[London: 
Rainbow-Bridge Book Co., 1970], p.142. 
3. Dominique Bagge, Les idles politigues en France sous la 
Restauration[New York: Arno Press, 1979; reprint of the 1952 
ed.], p.168. 
4. Philip Mansel, Louis XVIII[London: Blond & Briggs, 1981], 
p.344. 
5. Nora E. Hudson,Ultra-Royalism and the French 
Restoration[New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1973; 
reprint of the 1936 ed.], p.43.• 
J 
historian, Rager Soltau, failed ta mention Chateaubriand at 
all, despite his popularity and leadership in the 
Restaratian.[6] 
Clearly, these varying interpretations suggest that 
his ideas were too eclectic to be easily categorized. They 
also point to the difficulty ~f defining the different 
schools of thought in the Restoration. A royalist was 
fundamentally one who believed in the importance of a 
hereditary monarchy, specifically the Bourbon line; religion 
and tradition were also trademarks of a royalist's 
position. The other school, broadly speaking, was the 
liberal, distinguished by its support of constitutional 
government and the progressive ideas of representative 
government promoted by the Revolution. Obviously, these 
categories were somewhat artificial: within each there were 
different interpretations, and often there were similarities 
between the two. Chateaubriand was an excellent example of 
this connection between the two basic political views of the 
Restoration. 
It is not the purpose of this study, however, to reach 
a definition of royalism or of liberalism, nor to outline 
the political history of the period. Rather, the intention 
here is to examine Chateaubriand's political theory from 
1814 to 1820, with the hope of better understanding how one 
6. Roger Henry Soltau, French Political Thought in the 19th 
Century[New York: Russell & Russell, 1959.) 
participant viewed his age and the problems it confronted. 
While referring to some valuable secondary sources, the 
study will rely primarily upon Chateaubriand's own 
contributions, using his major political tracts and selected 
journalistic efforts. 
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Chapter I 
Chateaubriand's Political Associations 
The political situation immediately after the initial 
fall of Napoleon in 1814, was for Chateaubriand distinct 
from the experiences of the majority of those strongly 
identified with the Royalist cause. These included major 
groups. One was the circle of emigre royalists, whose 
general outlook remained largely anathema to the very idea 
of the Revolution itself. The second was the camp of 
extremists closely connected to the Count of Artois, whose 
idea of Restoration was consistently antagonistic to 
anything but a full return of the old monarchical 
principles. And the third group was composed of Royalist 
conspirators, known as the "Chevaliers de la foi'' (Knights 
of the Faith) who displayed a rigid, secretive hierarchy 
intent on the spreading of propaganda for the return of the 
Bourbon line.[7] All of these groups, loosely defined, 
would had only partially attracted the attention of 
Chateaubriand. 
Chateaubriand's emigre experience, which took him to 
6 
America, to London and various amorous adventures, and 
finally to witness the sufferings of his family in the 
Terror, was not closely tied to those of his fellow 
emigres. If one examines his actions during the youthful 
period following his travels to America, there will be 
discovered only a peripheral involvement in emigre affairs, 
for instance in his joining the exile army at Coblenz in 
1792, an exercise he himself characterized as folly. His 
Memoirs reveal, in fact, that this ragtag band seemed to him 
"honorable and touching •••• It presented the spectacle of the 
old monarchy and afforded a last glimpse of a dying 
world"[8] - hardly the stuff of inspired Royalist loyalty. 
Little evidence can be found that the author of the 
Genius of Christianity had m-0re than a passing interest in 
the ambitions and passions of the more extreme wing of 
Bourbon defenders, specifically the London emigres who 
rallied around the Count of Artois' efforts to reinstate the 
Bourbon monarchy.[9] The murder of the Duke of Enghien, in 
1804, led Chateaubriand to break with Napoleon, who 
previously had made the author secretary to the embassy in 
Rome. It was Chateaubriand's horror of Napoleon's treachery 
which forced him to react decisively against the Emperor. 
His lengthy account of Enghien's arrest and murder, retold 
8. Chateaubriand,Memoirs, trans., A.T. de Mattos, 6 
vols.[London: 1902], v.2, p.38. 
9. Vincent W. Beach, Charles X of France: H1s Life and 
Times[Boulder, Colorado: Pruett Publishing Company, 1971], 
ch.3, passim. 
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in his Memoirs, provided a portrait of a novelist'~ fondness 
for drama and suffering. His emphasis was on the heroic 
character of the Duke, and the tyrannical thirst for blood 
in Napoleon's ambitions.[10] 
This emphasis was of utmost concern, for it showed 
already, long before the possible return of Louis XVIII, 
that Chateaubriand was more concerned with the evils 
generated by despotism than the fortunes to be wished for in 
the memory of the Bourbons. While his contact with emigre 
circles was at best limited, he had virtually no association 
with the Count of Artois, nor with Artois' brother, Louis 
XVIII. Neither figure appears directly in his general 
correspondence,[11] and of any contact with the Royal 
circle, prior to 1814, he has this to say in his Memoirs: 
I had been presented to the King's brother 
[Artois]; he had been given my pamphlet to read, 
otherwise.he would not have known my name: he 
remembered to have seen me neither at the Court of 
Louis XVI, nor at the Camp of Thionville, and he 
had doubtless never heard speak of the Genie du 
Christianisme.[12] 
Chateaubriand may have been disappointed with this lack of 
recognition, but his statement clearly establishes his 
distance from the royal circle. A third group with which 
Chateaubri•nd may have had some contact was the ''Chevaliers 
10. Memoirs, v.2, pp.256ff. 
, , 
11. Correspondance generale, vols.l & 2 Paris:Gallimard, 
1977. 
• 
12. Memoirs,v.3, pp.76-77. 
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de la Foi," whose leader, Ferdinand de Bertier, insisted on 
secrecy, obedience, fidelity to God, honor, king, and 
country. It was an association which may well have colored 
his vision of the Restoration. De Bertier says that, "There 
seem to be significant indications that Chateaubriand was 
also a member of the order."(13] Yet Chateaubriand makes no 
' ' 
mention of it in his Memoirs, a deletion, perhaps, 
occasioned by his unwillingness to appear compromised by 
such an association; nor is there reference to the order in 
his correspondence. One can make no greater assumption than 
that he was attracted, if at all, more by the romantic 
notion of a heroic, knightly order than by the stern 
commitment of its faith. The lack of attention given by 
Chateaubriand to the group, it seems, was one more example 
of his distance from the organized royalist groups. 
Notably, these assertions about Chateaubriand, that he 
had little substantial connection with organized Royalist 
activists, force us to recognize that at the center of his 
conception of governmental authority and power was not a 
naive belief in the sanctity of the monarchic system, but a 
fear of the abuses of power, as manifested in the extremes 
of Revolution, Terror, and above all, Napoleon's arbitrary 
and capricious use of authority. 
It was the Revolution and Terror, after all, which had 
forced Chateaubriand and hundreds of royalist supporters 
13. De Bertier,The Restoration, p.15 
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into exile, which led to his witnessing of suffering and 
execution, and his feverrsh desire to combat excesses of 
political fanaticism. It was Napoleon who had recognized 
Chateaubriand's talents and brought him into his 
administration. His new-found respectability surely must 
have allowed a measure of gratefulness to the Emperor, and 
yet with the murde~ of the Duke of Enghien, this weak 
affection was entirely destroyed. Again, it was as witness 
to excess, not as one concerned solely with the return of a 
monarchic line, that he formed the basis of his political 
creed. 
10 
. Chapter II 
The Intentions of Des Buonaparte et des Bourbons 
In April, 1814, in the last days of Napoleon's rule, 
Chateaubriand succeeded in publishing his famous pamphlet, 
Des Buonaparte et des Bourbons.[14] It caused an immediate 
sensation in France; Louis XVIII is said to have remarked -
so Chateaubriand reminds us - that the work was more 
powerful than an army of one hundred thousand men, and 
Napoieon himself was impressed, if indeed we are to believe 
Chateaubriand.[15] The importance of the work for public 
opinion lies in its tim~liness, its relentless quarrel with 
all that Napoleon stood for, and the enthusiasm with which 
he welcomed the Bourbons. It marked for the author, as well, 
an emergence into the political limelight, comparable to his 
reception in literary circles with his earlier successes. 
Des Buonaparte et des Bourbons, issued in the midst of 
political confusion and military defeat, certainly led 
opinion to see the author placed squarely in the Royalist 
camp. It is still one of the most important documents of 
14. Des Buonaparte et des Bourbons[Paris: 1814]. 
15. Memoirs, v.J, pp.65-66. 
11 
• 
• 
the early Restoration, primarily because of its d~lineation 
of the negative aspects of Napoleonic rule, as well for the 
convenience with which Royalists then and later could point 
to the legitimacy of Bourbon rule. Its importance for us, 
however, lies in a closer examination of its principles, 
ievealing the inherent tensions of the return of the old 
Monarchy. 
Chateaubriand wasted no time in presenting his most 
basic concerns: religion, nationalism, and especially 
liberty. The hand of Providence, he wrote, is present in 
all that has happened, and Napoleon is without asylum. With 
Napoleon, the fatherland was brought to ruin; still, one 
word lives, Liberty, which is not of itself responsible for 
the crimes of the past: "La libert' ne doit point &tre 
I 
accusee des forfeits que l'on commit sous son nom."[16] In 
sudden, sweeping terms, Chateaubriand laid the foundations 
for his later, theoretical distinctions from the traditional 
views of the Ultras: one need not use the Revolutionary 
Trinity, Egalit~, Fraternitt, Libert~, but Liberte cannot be 
compromised. Thus he started a theme which he of ten tried 
to reconcile with his vision of the organic French nation. 
It must be remarked, however, that this pamphlet was 
emotional and perhaps even confused. His argument revealed 
the character of a man obsessed with deposing the great 
emperor, the first necessary step in restoring any sort of 
• 
16. Des Buonaparte et des Bourbons,pp.l-2. 
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stability and tradition to French society. Furthermore, 
there was a personal element to be admitted: he must have 
seen his political future, and reputation, tied to the 
success of his writing. Beyond financial gain and the 
possibility of a political position, he saw in his faithful 
~rejects the chance for being awarded the Cross of 
Saint-Louis, and the military grade of colonel.(17] 
No doubt, the opportunity to sing the virtues of an 
old-regime France gave Chateaubriand ample room to imagine 
an order of life distinguished by the spiritual nature of 
the French people. Napoleon's reign brought an end to the 
customs and spirit of France: "In the name of (Napoleon's) 
law, religion and morality were overthrown."(18] 
Reminiscent of Burke's attack on the French Revolution, 
Chateaubriand decried the renunciation of "the experience 
and the customs of our fathers." It w•s, in a sense, as 
organic conception of traditional society as that evoked by 
Burke; it countered the legalistic, artificial state to 
historically'evolved society, yet it offered no evidence of 
historical detail to substantiate its argument. The newly 
) 
created, newly ordered state, consolidated by Napoleon, 
became a society founded on uncertain reason, "sans pass~ et 
sans avenir."[19] It was not explained, however, just what 
17. Chateaubriand, Correspondence generale, v.2, letter no. 
649, 3 July 1814, pp.211-212. 
18. Des Buonaparte et des Bourbons, p.2. 
19. Ibid. 
1J 
marked this so-called traditional society; religion and 
morality were insufficient terms for historic definition. 
Chateaubriand used this vague historic past simply as a 
means to erase any claim of Napoleonic legitimacy. 
The attack on Napoleon's rule also contained a curious 
reference to having created a society "without past and 
without future." The past, indeed, was ~enied by the 
Emperor, but also by the Revolution. Napoleonic "despotism'' 
usurped religion and arbitrarily forfeited liberty, under 
the false nationalism of a foreigner who deceived the French 
people; the use of the spelling of Napoleon's name was quite 
purp~seful, noting the Corsican's foreign blood, a jab which 
some translators have inexplicably overlooked.[20] But what 
of the "future" which Napoleon was accused of having 
rejected? Nothing of the future of the old regime was 
explained, but worse still, Napoleon, who disavowed the 
past, could provide only an interminable present, without 
hope, with his vain, censorial regime. Again, Chateaubriand 
was unconcerned with establishing a solid historical vision, 
intent only upon tracing the tragedy of France to Napoleon. 
The immediate.power of Des Buonaparte et des Bourbons 
was in its description of the betrayal of the French race. 
"Chaque nation a ses vices. Ceux des Francais ne sont pas 
20. for instance, the translator of the Memoirs leaves the 
spelling ~Bonaparte." 
21. Des Buonaparte et des Bourbons, p.7. 
la trahison, la noirceur, et l'ingratitude."(21] Napoleon's 
genius lay in his subtle rise to power; deception and 
personal interest were his trademarks. Chateaubriand feared 
the ignorance of those born after the Revolution, that they 
did not know france's ancient rulers, but saw only the 
troubles and misfortunes of the past. These youth, along 
with the naive Republicans and Royalists who welcomed him, 
were trounced by his true ambitions.(22] The time would 
come, Chateaubriand hoped, when the French would freely 
declare that they had nothing to do with Napoleon's 
inglorious heritage. 
The use of police oppression to force the French into 
submission was the hallmark of Napoleon's domestic politics; 
I 
a good administrator, yes, but of the necessities of life, 
respect for rights, property, family, etc., his government 
was the worst.[23] In foreign policy, not victories but the 
conscription will stand as the greatest symbol of his 
rule.[24] More notable for the modern student, having 
witnessed the methods of the totalitarian state, was the 
"Orwellian double-speak''of Napoleon's rule, the abuse of 
language for state authority: 
\ Alers commencerent les grandes Saturnales de 
la royautJ: les crimes, !'oppression, l'esclavage 
marcherent d'un pas egal avec la folie. Toute 
liberte expire, tout sentiment honorable, toute 
22. Ibid~ pp.3-4. 
23. Ibid., pp.8-11. 
24. Ibid., pp.14ff. 
15 
pens~e genereuse deviennent des conspirations 
contre l'Etat. Si on parle de vertu, on est 
suspect; louer une belle action, c'est une injure 
faite au prince. Les mots changerit d'acceRtion: 
un peuple qui combat pour ses souverains legitimes 
est un peuple rebelle; un trattre est un sujet 
fidele; la France entiere devient !'empire du 
mensonge: journaux, pamphlets, discours, prose et 
vers, tout deguise la verite.[25] . 
Without the prescience of a wider-ranging mind, 
Chateaubriand still was able to understand the methods of 
Napoleon, by which contrary opinions were reduced to 
impotence. 
In a summation of Napoleon's evil, in which 
Chateaubriand addresses him in the personal, and 
provocative, ~tu", the Emperor was responsible for 
destroying all of France's greatness. The people wanted a 
monarchy founded on the bases of equality of rights, of 
morality, of civil liberty, of political and religious 
toleration. Instead he gave them impious war, the 
16 
imprisonment of the Pope, the murder of the Duke of Enghien. 
He lost colonies, commerce, opened America to the English. 
Who corrupted French customs, took children from their 
parents, devastated families, ravaged the mind, inspired 
horror in the name of France throughout the world? It was 
Napoleon. Behind the mask of Caesar and Alexander, he made 
of France a ruined country.[26] 
Such are the words, Chateaubriand wrote, with which we 
25. Ibid., pp.7-8. 
26. 1.2..!..£·' pp.27-31. 
must address Buonaparte. But, he added, if we reject 
Napoleon, who shall replace him? It was, obviously, the 
King, yet not so evident were the reasons for the choice. 
Chateaubriand spent the majority of his pamphlet vilifying 
the Emperor; here lay the burden of his propaganda. The 
French had to re-learn the truth of their rightful 
inheritance, not be swayed by the foreign usurper. It was 
not just a despot they were to reject, however, nor was it 
simply a Bourbon monarch they were to welcome: the King 
represented in his title the idea of legitimate authority, 
of order, peace, and legal and monarchic liberty.[27] In 
replacing one form of rule with another, Chateaubriand was 
seeking not to merely elevate a royal person to power, but 
to restore above all else the ideas of legitimacy. 
17 
In this we find an emphasis easily overlooked by those 
who call Chateaubriand a typical Royalist. His language was 
distinct: the King must represent the truths of his people, 
but it is not as a leader with absolute power that he will 
rule. "Les fonctions attach,es ~ ce titre sont si connues 
de francais, qu'ils n'ont pas besoin de se le faire 
expliquer.~(28] It was in the best interests of the people 
that the King rule, but one may also assume, conversely, 
that the King would lose his legitimacy if he did not 
fulfill his functions. This distinction, loosely applied in 
27. Ibid., p.31. 
28. Ibid. 
19 
the pamphlet, arose again when Chateaubriand differed with 
the King and his ministry on the duties of his mission. 
The enthusiasm of Chateaubriand calling back the 
legitimate Monarch was subtly tempered by the role he was to 
play. France, misled by Napoleon, confused the proper role 
of a ruler: 
Le roi, le magistrat, le p~re; un Francais 
confond ces idees. Il ne sait ce que c'est qu'un 
empereur; il ne connott pas la nature, la forme, 
la limite du pouvoir attache a ce titre etranger. 
Mais il sait ce que c'est qu'un monarque 
descendant de saint Louis et de Henri IV: c'est un 
chef dont la puissance paternelle est reglee par 
des institutions, temp~r~e par le temps, comme un 
vin genereux, n~ de la terre de la patrie, et mdri 
par le soleil de la France.[29] 
Only a ruler blessed with the true blood of France, 
not Napoleon's foreign blood, was capable of bringing to the 
nation the virtues Chateaubriand extolled. And a Bourbon, 
descended from the noble heritage of .Saint~Louis and Henri 
IV, inherited the experience of centuries, of. adversity and 
glory, and would bring to France the greatness she once 
enjoyed. Were this misty idolatry not proof enough (and it 
really was not, of course), Chateaubriand outlined Louis' 
fitting qualities: 
Non-seulement Louis XVIII a ces idees fixes, 
cette moderation, ce bon sens si necessaires ~ un 
monarque, mais c'est encore un prince ami des 
lettres, instruit et eloquent comme plusieurs de 
nos rois, d'un esprit vaste et eclaire, d'un 
caractere ferme et philosophiques.[30] 
29. Ibid., p.32. 
30. Ibid., p.34 
No doubt this passage, lifted out of context, could be 
. 
const~ued as a complete endorsement of the Bourbon return 
under Louis XVIII. But there was a clear, if subtle 
limitation in the midst of this otherwise rosy picture: 
. De taus les souverains qui peuvent gouverner 
~ pr~sent la france, d'est peut-~tre celui qui 
convient le mieux a notre position et a !'esprit 
du siecle •••• Les institutions des peuples sent 
l'ouvrage du temps et de !'experience: pour regner 
il f aut surtout de la raison et de 
l'uniformite.(31] 
Chateaubriand envisioned louis XVIII as a wise, tolerant 
king, willing to forgive the nation its crimes. Above all, 
he would guarantee the stability which was forfeited in the 
upheavals of the past quarter century. 
Chateaubriand, of course, continued to praise Louis 
XVIII as this mast fitting King. Evidently there must have 
been pressure upon the author (possibly financial, or his 
own desire to be accepted), to make this pamphlet pleasing 
to the most likely group to come into power, the Royalists. 
Thus his warning was, albeit gentle, nevertheless clearly 
pronounced. A more conservative Royalist would have 
shuddered to see Chateaubriand betray the royal heritage. 
Would it not be blasphemy to suggest that the king be 
limited by institutions, especially those forged in the 
recent past, the Revolution? That would mean that to accept 
the King, one would as well be forced, at least implicitly, 
31. Ibid. 
19 
to accept the Revolution! And yet it was quite clear that 
Chateaubriand called for the King to be wed with the spirit 
of the century. Certainly not, he argued emphatically, 
could the French accept the foreign dictator; but what then 
was it to accept the times? It meant clearly, although the 
language was somewhat euphemistic, to concede to the basic. 
reality of the Revolution. 
Unlike Burke, whose attack on the Revolution was 
explicit and fundamental - "To make a revolution is to 
subvert the ancient state of our country; and no common 
reasons are called for to justify so violent a 
proceeding " [32] - Chateaubriand seemed ambiguous about 
the nature and justification of 1789. Whereas Burke abhorred 
I 
the reckless intervention of man into the natural order of 
society, Chateaubriand was willing to see revolution, 
particularly the French Revolution, as part of the 
inevitable course of history. As Paul Beik has written, 
"One can see that he inclined toward the Greek view (of 
history), however, and that for him the laws of nature made 
for cyclical change rather than for evolution upwards."(33] 
This allowed him a relatively dispassionate perspective on 
the causes of the Revolution, one certain to receive little 
goodwill from its orthodox critics. It also offered him the 
32. Edmund Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France, 
and Thomas Paine, The Rights of Man,[New York: Doubleday & 
Co., 1961], p.181. 
33. Paul H. Beik, The French Revolution Seen From the Right, 
[New York: Howard Fertig, 1970], p.86. 
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ability to see the French Revolution from both sides. In a 
footnote to his section 6n the "Encyclopedistes,'' in his 
Essai historigue of 1797, he provided this assessment of the 
philosophes' culpability: 
Qu'il soit bien entendu qu'ils n'en sent pas 
la seule cause, mais une grande cause. La 
revolution fran9aise ne Vient point de,tel OU tel 
homme, de tel ou tel livre: elle vient des 
choses. Elle etait inevitable; c'est ce que mille 
gens ne veulent pas se persuader. Elle provient 
surtout du progres de la societe ~ la fois vers 
les lumi~res et vers la corruption; c'est pourquoi 
on remarque dens la revolution francaise tant 
d'excellents principes et de consequences 
funestes. Les premiers derivent d'une theorie 
eclairee; les secondes, de la corruption des 
moeurs.[34] 
The Revolution could not be denied, therefore, 
although one had to condemn its extreme results. 
Chateaubriand had in mind the sufferings of his own family, 
as well as the many ofthers caught up in the Terror. The 
worst of these was Napoleon's conquest of power and his 
degradation of the French spirit. But in calling back the 
Bourbons, Chateaubriand did not pretend to condone the 
realities of the Ancien Regime. In Des Buonaparte et des 
Bourbons, he sayed nothing of the corruption of French 
customs or the Failures of the Monarchy. His Essai 
historigue was written in a counter-revolutionary spirit, 
yet he also felt a strong revulsion for the new society it 
had created. The most admirable aspect of the Revolution, 
however, was its idealism; and though he did not reveal any 
34. Essai historique, in Oeuvres Compl~tes, v. 13 [Paris: 
1852], p.233n. 
great optimism for their possible fulfillment, he does see 
in the ideas of the time a possible regeneration.[35] It 
was a sense of emptiness which the Revolution attempted to 
overcome. To go back to the Ancien Regime, then, would be 
an exercise in futility. 
At best, as Beik argues, Chateaubriand's so-called 
traditionalism was one of despair.[36] He saw in Napoleon's 
rule a final loss of the nation's true spirit. The 
Restoration was not meant to be a return to the order of the 
past, but a rebirth of the French spirit. In this, the 
Bourbons were the most representative of the highest claims 
of all that was good through the centuries; but he also 
understood that this was a spiritual return~ not a reversion 
to the corruption, narrow-mindedness, and emptiness that 
brought on the Revolution. 
Behind the laudatory language of Des Buonaparte et des 
Bourbons, which was to the royalists its most estimable 
aspect, one senses that Chateaubriand recognizeed that the 
Restoration could be the only course open to France. The 
only type of rule able to restore the natural French love 
for religion, national pride, and liberty was that expressed 
in the inherited wisdom and paternalism of the Bourbons. 
There was a strong hope here that the Bourbon line was 
capable of such a task, but there was, it seems, a caution. 
35. Beik, Revolution Seen from the Right, pp.87-89. 
36. Ibid., p.90. 
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It was Chateaubriand's insistence on Liberty (a term not 
adequately defined in the pamphlet), a right of the French 
which had to be respected by the king. The circumstances of 
publishing and having the work accepted by Royalist circles 
certainly prevented Chateaubriand from outlining what he 
intended precisely, for it would have lost its most basic 
appeal, a call for unified support for the Restoration. When 
Chateaubriand proclaims, "Vive le Roi," it is only an 
initial sanction; the complexity of the slogan is surely not 
lost on the authox. 
A final section of the pamphlet added still further to 
understanding the complications of the Restoration. It was 
the appeal to the Allies to support the Bourbon return. 
Once again, he began by attacking Napoleon, defiling his 
dishonest and cavalier conquest of Europe. But the tenor of 
his writing shifted slightly from the praise with which he 
welcomed the Bourbons and extolled the French race, to one 
of political exp~diency. Obviously Chateaubriand could not 
argue that to revive the claims of national pride would be 
beneficial to the Allies. His encouragement for their 
support of the Restoration rested largely on the 
practicality which would serve their interests. 
As de Bertier writes, of the Allies' demands, 
Chateaubriand was not unique in demanding the overthrow of 
Napoleon. The Allied Sovereigns, in their manifesto of 
December l, 1813, declared that they "are not waging war 
• 
against France •••• They are only warring against the Emperor, 
2:3 
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or rather against that preponderance which he has too long 
exercised beyond his empire to the detriment of France and 
Europe."[37] But if there was consensus on deposing the 
Emperor, it was lacking in the Allies' plans for choosing a 
successor. England's opinion on the subject conformed most 
directly t~ Chateaubriand's,[38] and he recognized the need 
to persuade the rest of the European coalition through his 
propaganda. 
The Allies demanded that for the Bourbons to be 
acceptable, the French people had to show their approval. 
Chateaubriand's pamphlet (sub-titled specifically not only 
for rallying the rrench, but also all of the European powers 
around the Bourbon Restoration), appealed first to the 
I 
French for their natural goodness, then to the Allies for 
their natural good sense. Only with a Bourbon on the throne 
would the French people be once more happy, and the Allies 
expect the stability and'peace of ruling Europe alongside a 
truly legitimate Monarch. It was the same argument as 
throughout the work: Louis represented the glory and 
sensibility of centuries of French leadership, and this 
inheritance shared the same traditions and customs as the 
rest of the legitimate Europe sovereigns. The fear of a 
foreigner whose usurpation of power brought· Europe almost to 
ruin did not apply to "brothers united by the Christian 
37. De Bertier, fhe Restoration, p.18. 
38. Ibid., pp.19-20. 
religion and their ancient memories."(39] 25 The Allies, after 
all, were France's liberators, not her conquerors; they 
recognized the true French from the Usurper. 
Addressing the Allies, Chateaubriand's argument had a 
tone of almost simple practicality, with an additional bit 
of reverence for good measure. It was the French people, 
however, whom he saw as most in need of moderation, and 
probably limited, by experience, in restoring unity to the 
nation. If Chateaubriand's traditionalism, as has been 
said, was one of despair, his final words hinted at the same 
sense, that simply restoring the monarchy would not by 
itself heal France's wounds: 
Francais! amis, compagnons d'infortune, 
oublions nos querelles, nos haines, nos erreurs, 
pour sauver la patrie; embrassons-nous sur les 
ruines de notre.cher pays •••• Songeons que taus les 
maux que nous ~prouvons ••• sont l'ouvrage d'un seul 
homme. Faisons done entendre de .toutes parts le 
cri qui peut nous sauver, le cri que nos peres 
f aisoient retentir dens le malheur comme dans la 
victoire, et qui sera pour nous le signal de la 
paix et du bonheur: Vive le Roi![40] 
Nowhere, perhaps, can one turn to find a more 
devastating account of Napoleonic "despotism," yet behind 
its impassioned rhetoric the pamphlet was hardly a 
masterpiece of political theory. Its author seemed only to 
have grasped the broad outlines of legitimacy, and injected 
into them the feverish impulses of the moment. In 1814, at 
least, such writing was enough to create certain celebrity. 
39. Des Buonar:a!"te et jes Bourbons, .Po43. 
40. Ibid., p.46. 
Chapter III 
The limitations of Political Authority 
Judging by this analysis of Des Buonaparte et des 
Bourbons, Chateaubriand's Royalism was based on Monarchic 
legitimacy, but with restrictions built into the King's 
role. Nothing concrete was mentioned of his support for 
constitutional government, although the concept of Liberty, 
vaguely outlined, stood out clearly. Liberty and Monarchy, 
two ideas with possibly contradictory implications, 
therefore, formed the basis of his vision of the proper 
order. 
Des Buonaparte et des Bourbons was an emotionally 
charged political tract; it lacked a tempered analysis, 
which evidently did not take away from its overall 
popularity. Its eloquence made up for its analytical 
shortcomings. In fact, as C.T. Muret has written, 
"Chateaubriand was neither a philosopher nor a statesman; he 
26 
was a poet who had wandered into politics. 27 The source of · 
his ideas was emotional rather intellectual, and he was both 
royalist and liberal from sentiment more than from 
philosophic conviction."[!] His political theory might have 
remained vague and untonvincing were it not for De la 
Monarchie selon la Charte.[2] Many of his political writings 
revolved around immediate circumstances;[3] in this work, 
however, he presented his comprehensive theory of 
government. It was, to be sure, substantially still a 
Royalist tract, but Chateaubriand prefaced it by explaining 
that the word ''royalist" was intended to embrace all the 
royalists. He recognized, just as,he did in Des Buonaparte 
et des Bourbons, the divisions among those who favored the 
return of the monarchy. Though the work is not one of 
penetrating insight - one commentator has written that 
Chateaubriand lacked originality but not relevance [4] - it 
is generally considered one of the most influential writings 
of the period, and succeeded in placing the author in the 
forefront of Royalism, even among those who worried that the 
arguments were too liberal. 
From the very beginning, Chateaubriand tried to appeal 
1. C.T. Muret, French Royalist· Doctrines since the 
Revolution[New ~ark: Columbia University Press, 1933], p.35. 
2. N.B., separate edition of the Oeuvres 
completes,[Bruxelles,1835], v.26. 
3. See, for example, hi~ Opinions et Discours and Pol{migue. 
4. E. Beau de Lomenie, La carri~re politigue de 
Chateaubriand, de 1814 a 1830[Paris: Plan, 1929], II: p.354. 
to French practicality; common sense, he wrote, is a thing 
more rare than its good name suggests. The Revolution, and 
all the chaos that surrounded it, forced the French to 
forget their proper sensibility. Nonetheless, the nation 
inherited a new system, established by the Charter, which 
based ~epresentative government on four parts: the Royalty 
(or Royal prerogative), the Chamber of Peers, the Chamber of 
Deputies, and the Ministry (later we shall see that he· might 
have included the press as well, for its role was crucial in 
a representative system). The fundamental principle of the 
constitutional, Royal prerogative was that nothing proceeds 
directly from the King in the actual acts of government, but 
that everything is the work of the Ministry. The King is 
sacred ~nd inviolable, in fact infallible,·and if there is 
error it is the fault of the Ministry.[5] 
The implication of this approach was crucial~ We have 
seen that in Des Buonaparte et des Bourbons Chateaubriand 
conceived of the king's role as a symbolic one; he 
represents the true spirit of the French, its past and its 
ancient truths, but this does not give the king any type of 
absolute power. Because mistakes will be made in governing, 
the king, by his very nature sacred and inviolable, must be 
protected. The Royalty must be preserved at all cost. Thus 
Chateaubriand carried his abstract notion of the King, and 
the even more abstract notion of the French spirit, into the 
5. De la Monarchie selon la Charte, pp.l-6. 
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A Royalist would have said that the King is above 
responsibility; but because he relied on this abstract, hazy 
vision of the King and his people to support his fundamental 
beliefs, Chateaubriand worked himself into an obvious - and, 
far a political theorist, embarrassing - contradiction. For 
if the King is infallible, why should he not make the 
rules? The Count of Artois might have found this a pleasant 
possibility, but Chateaubriand, suspicious of any singular 
consolidation of power, stopped short of any claim to 
absolute sovereignty. 
The real model for this monarchic rule was closer to 
the English system than to that proposed by his more 
conservative counterparts: the monarch, in essence, reigns 
but does not govern. It was a Royalism_inspired by the 
pleasant vision of the King as a wise, paternal sovereign, 
uniting in his title all the needs and gifts of the nation, 
at the very least reminding the French that they are a 
.united nation based on worthy traditions. Yet it was also 
restrained by pessimism, a distrust of excess power and the 
abuse of accountability. To lose a Monarch by his own 
excesses, which absolute sovereignty invites, would be to 
shatter the fragile stability of the nation. Even in 
England, Chateaubriand wrote, all harmony is lost if even 
the King's name is invoked in debates in Parliament.[6] 
6. Ibid., p.11. 
It is important here to mention an objection to 
Chateaubriand's perceived role as a leader of the 
Ultra-Royalist group, and the larger purpose of writing his 
pamphlet. General misconceptions have plagued secondary 
interpretations by not drawing attention to the complexity 
of his suggestions. For instance, the excellent work by 
Rene Remond argues clearly that Chateaubriand was a leader 
JO 
of the Ultras, without mentioning that it was the Ultras who 
adopted, quite selectively, some of his slogans.[7] Or turn 
to the helpful study by C.T. Muret, which states that the 
Ultras "adopted the liberal theory of the responsibility of 
ministers to the parliamentary majority, in order to force 
their will upon the king. Chateaubriand was in full 
agreement with these views."[8] Indeed, Chateaubriand 
demanded ministerial responsibility, but only as long as it 
was intended, ultimately, to uphold the Charter. 
Certainly, the Ultras echoed many of Chateaubriand' s 
views. But the purpose in publishing De la Monarchie selon 
la Charte was not to callously abuse the Charter for 
elitist, reactionar; ends. He believed deeply in its 
necessity as a tool for modern government. As we have seen, 
Chateaubriand was suspicious of political power, whether it 
be the fanaticism of groups, as in the Revolution, or the 
7. Ren~ R~mond, The Right Wing in France, from 1815 to de 
Gaulle[Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 
1966], ~.37. 
8. Muret,french Royalist Doctrines, p.39. 
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single-handed manipulations of Napoleon's rule• Although he 
wished to make some changes in the Charter's lesser rules, 
he was convinced that it was to be the fundamental safeguard 
of the liberties of the french. 
The social situation which Chateaubriand alluded to, 
the almost pastoral nature of f rench society in a 
properly-ordered state, was far .from an egalitarian, 
democratic state. His idea of Liberty was defensive, 
protective or basic claims to human dignity •• He did not 
promote ''progressive" ideas which sought in the idea of 
Liberty fundamental changes in the social order. He was not 
closed to change, however; rather, he opposed excessive 
power in any direction. In this way, the liberals could, by 
excising some of the more objectionable language, find much 
to agree with in the pamphlet. 
Just as the royalists claimed aspects of 
Chateaubriand's thought, so, too, could members of the 
opposition to the ''Chambre Introuvable" adapt certain 
ideas. Such adaptability, as well as the power and often 
basic common sense of his writing, created a crossing of 
lines, and blurred the distinctions which might have made 
Chateaubriand a more easily categorized figure. It also, 
unfortunately, lowered his stock as a consistent and 
predictable party leader. De Bertier is correct in 
asserting that Chateaubriand wished for a royalist majority 
in Parliament, but its ultimate purpose was to be different 
than what the core of the Royalists wanted. Even de Bertier 
admits, after all, that "the party considered Viscount 
Bonald (a reactionary who found nothing legitimate·in 
France's Revolutionary heritage) to be their real spokesman, 
and he considered the Charter to be a work of ~ally and 
darkness~"[9] 
One may look upon Chateaubriand's goals as somewhat 
politically naive, considering that he stuck to his moderate 
royalist principles while many of the royalists themselves 
differed in many real ways. It was perhaps more reflective 
of his pessimism, however, that he saw the true interests of 
France protected in the history and traditions of the most 
responsible class, which the Royalists comprised, even if 
they would have to grudgingly accept the inevitable spirit 
of the new century. He was no more willing to compromise 
his support of the Charter than he was to accept a France 
governed by atheists, democrats, or regicides. 
A good example of both the immediacy and subtlety of 
De la Monarchie selon la Charte was his support of the open 
initiative in Parliament. A conservative royalist might have 
supposed that it was an attack against the powers of the 
Ministry, which in part it was. But can we assume that was 
all it stood for? Chateaubriand felt that the Ministry 
should be held accountable for the errors of decision in the 
executive branch, for obvious reasons. The king must be 
protected from the scandals which the Ministry had created 
9. De Bertier,The Restoration, p.143. 
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in its policies. Primarily, these revolved around the sale 
of national forests, which the royalists intended to return 
to the Church; the dissolution of the "Chambre Introuvable," 
which was a legally constituted majority in Parliament, and 
thus the Ministry's action was illegal, and immoral; and by 
the general attempts to usurp power, especially the actions 
of Decazes, the minister of police, in his intrigues in 
Louis' court. In these matters, Chateaubriand was in full 
accord with the Royalist majority.[10] 
His inspiration in publishing the pamphlet was more 
complex, however, than a simple royalist reaction to the 
offensive actions of thjs particular Ministry. He believed 
strongly that.the conspiracies of Decazes threatened not 
just the wishes of the majoriiy, but the nature of 
representative government as well: 
La proposition secr~te de la loi ne peut 
mame jamais ~tre si secrete qu'elle ne parvienne 
au public, defiguree: !'initiative franche est de 
la nature du gouvernement representatif .[11] 
furthermore, to renounce the majority, he wrote, was to 
shatter the great jutisdiction of representative 
government. Certainly, ,it can be argued that Chateaubriand 
was defending the interests of the majority; his language 
emphasized, however, the need to transcend particular 
issues, to maintain a vision of proper government: 
10. Ibid., pp.!Jo-39. 
11. De la Monarchie selon la Charte, p.15. 
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I had resisted the seizure of the Monarchie 
selon la Charte to enlighten misled royalty, and 
to uphold the liberty of thought and of the press; 
I had frankly embraced our institutions, and I 
remained loyal to them.[12] 
The institutions to which Chateaubriand refered were 
34 
noticably restricted to the balance of forces between the 
Chambers, the King, and th~ Ministry, as well as the press, 
which was also a contributing force to harmony. The changes 
the Charter allowed, and which the Ministry was taking in 
its own direction, prompted Chateaubriand to express his 
fears about the impending destruction of representative 
government. He favored a vigorous role for the Chamber of 
Peers, in part because it most conformed to France's true 
nature, but also because of the dangers an irresponsible 
Ministry and a powerful Chamber of Deputies would 
create.[13] The implicit suspicion of the Chamber of 
Deputies, though not openly defined, rested on the 
association of its aims with those of self-aggrandizing 
politicians, for whom the future of France was of little 
conce~n. And the Ministers were no different. 
The French genius was outside of the Chamber of 
Deputies and the Ministry. It was symbolized in the 
Monarchy, sustained by the Peers of France, and most 
threatened by the selfish men who claimed to speak for the 
people, and who turned Louis' ear the wrong way. The 
12. Memoirs, v.4, p.11. 
• 
13. De la Monarchie selon la Charte, pp.26-27. 
Charter was to protect this delicate balance: we must make 
use of this Charter, Chateaubriand wrote, if we don't then 
French genius is incompatible with representative 
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government.[14] Again, the fear was expressed that abuse of 
power was to be expected in the conspiratorial aims of the 
Ministry: 
La force d'un ministre francois n'est pas 
seulement dens son cabinet: elle est aussi dens 
son salon.[15] 
Under no circumstances was a minister to be trusted, 
especially when it came to influencing public opinion. 
His most consistently expressed fear was that public 
opinion could be distorted if there was no true freedom of 
the press. It was Chateaubriand's opinion that the journals 
represented the reality of public opinion, the right of 
dissent from governmental action. In fact, the press was so 
important that it could be considered a tribunal, just as a 
Deputy was a tribune; this confirmed the interpretation that 
he saw the press as a fifth organ of government. It was a 
logical argument, but it raised a curious and difficult 
suggestion: Chateaubriand argued that just as a Deputy must 
meet a certain financial requirement to sit in the Chamber, 
so too must a journal meet requirements. He called for a 
thousand-franc deposit for all journals, which would assure 
that the press was responsible to public opinion. There was 
14. Ibid., p.30. 
15. Ibid., p.54. 
an obvious dilemma which Chateaubriand passed over, namely, 
that a required deposit provided opportunity for 
censorship. Deciding what was in the best interest of 
public opinion was an arbitrary a form of control. In fact, 
"public opinion" was another unclarif ied idea useful to 
Chateaubriand as a means of arguing that whoever the 
opponent may be, was out of step with the truth. 
It can be argued that Chateaubriand was caught up in 
the same feverish pitch of politics as the rest of the 
combatants in the battle for the Restoration. In many cases, 
irrationality, or a gap in logic, interrupted otherwise 
reasoned attempts to come to terms with the diverse forces 
of the period. The issue of a press law confounded most 
theorists trying to reconcile a free press with the demands 
of public morality and safety. He was not alone, therefore, 
in wrestling with the complicated issue. On a broader 
level, shortsightedness and reaction to immediate 
circumstances forced a more notorious reversal of logic, 
when in the debate on the Amnesty Law, the Liberals defended 
the Royal prerogative "and the Ultra-royalists became the 
champions of parliamentary authority."[16] Such a 
contradiction can only be understood in .light of the dangers 
which all sides saw in any movements of their political 
enemies. 
In a political situation in which all factions see the 
16. Ibid., p.135. 
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moment as a critical turning point for the future, 37 
inconsistency is bound to play a role, and extremism, often 
deplored by all sides in more harmonious times, is justified 
as a necessary resort. There is nothing inevitable in 
politics, and this applies to the Restoration: the force of 
circumstance in a volatile time often carries the d~y. 
Neither the left nor the right exclusively planted the seeds 
for the fall of the Bourbon line. Unfortunately, the most. 
salutary aspects of De la Monarchie selon la Charte could 
not heal the divisions in France, and Chateaubriand's 
impassioned pleas suffered the same fate as moderation of ten 
does in times of crisis. With so much at stake, and so many 
opinions, one voice, determined to be fair, is easily 
overwhelmed. 
Chapter IV 
le Conservateur, and the End of Moderation 
Chateaubriand 1 s moderation and independence of spirit 
never led him to abandon the Royalists in the political 
fight. He still showed a deep commitment to the idea of 
Monarchy, of tradition, of religion, and especially of the 
Charter. By 1818, however, after three years of political 
turmoil, his fears of the encroachment of Liberal ideology 
had become more pronounced. Most telling was his alarm at 
the success of liberal journals, such as the Quotidienne and 
the Constitutionnel, both which displayed vague Bonapartist 
tendencies. The influence of Bonapartist and Liberal ideas 
appeared to outweigh that of the Royalist press, and 
Chateaubriand responded by acting as an editor and 
contributor to the Conservateur.[17] In his Memoirs he 
claimed the journal was of utmost importance to the royalist 
cause.[18] His leadership , because of his brilliance and 
popularity, lent a great deal to its success. It was 
basically an Ultra organ, but his involvement kept it 
17. Le Conservateur[Paris:l818-1820], 6 vols., issued 
irregularly. 
18. Memoirs, v.4, pp.16-17. 
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strictly constitutional, and it succeeded in its primary 
mission, which is apparent in reviewing Chateaubriand's 
articles, in embarrassing the Ministry.[19] 
A difference in tone emerged in his writing in the 
Conservateur: just as Des Buonaparte et des Bourbons was a 
vitriolic attack on the Emperor and a panegyric for the 
Monarchy, and De la Monarchie selon la Charte was a more 
analytical argument for constitutional, Royalist government, 
Chateaubriand focused specifically on the Ministry in 
moralizing, frantic condemnations. Frustration, fear, and 
finally a disgust with Louis' ministers informed most of his 
articles. The attacks were supported by urgent references 
to the purpose of the Charter. Throughout, his writings 
appeared to foreshadow his later, official break with the 
regime, but at least in the journal his warnings were 
articulated, devoid of his personal quarrels with the 
Ministry; and his faith in the Monarch still existed, though 
what Louis allowed strained the author's patience. 
The fi~st issue (5 October 1818) began with 
Chateaubriand's introduction and praise for the project 
being undertaken. Royalists of more conservative bent, whom 
he considered to be his good friends, would also participate 
in the journal's campaign, but immediately Chateaubriand 
informed his readers that constitutional government was the 
19. Irene Collins, The Government and the News a er Press in 
France, 1814-188l[London: Oxford University Press, 1959 , 
pp.20-21. 
overriding concern of Le Conservateur. We want nothing that 
is not constitutional, he wrote, "Nous voulons la Charte." 
And he sounded the call which was the journal's slogan for 
its entire existence: "Le Conservateur soutiendra la 
religion, .le Roi, la liberte, la Charte et les honn~tes 
gens, ou ni moi ni mes amis ne pouvons nous y 
intJresser.''[20] "HonnAtes gens" was not a term which 
refered to simple, acceptable virtue; it compriseed a vision 
of the social and political order which transcended the base 
ambitions of the Ministry and the enemies of true 
representative government, by invoking the 17th Century 
notion 9f the term. Whereas in 1815 he had hoped to appeal 
to the good sense of anyone involved in government (recall, 
too, the note of pessimism which surfaced in his writing), 
it was now apparent that no hope remained for such a 
tactic. Only an attack on his enemies, comparable to his 
attack on Napoleon, would suffice. Chateaubriand now 
A 
appealed only to his allies, the "honnetes gens." Whatever 
sensibility existed could not be found in the Ministry. 
Already his moderation was waning: the sense that all 
factions might agree to unify for the sake of France had 
disappeared, and it was. the fault of self-interested 
politicians. His opinion was that only the royalists, in 
their support of king, religion, liberty, and the Charter, 
wished to maintain representative government. 
20. Le Conservateur, v.l, p.7. 
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Chateaubriand saw also another threat, perhaps sooner 
than many others recognized it, the abuse of the thoery of 
Egalit~. Equality was fine, of course, if it could only 
work, but it was being invoked as a dangerous political 
weapon, rather than as a sincere concern for all men. for 
all the supposed idealism of its advocates, they were no 
different than the men of '93, whose hypocritical love of 
liberty and equality came only from hatred and envy.[21] 
Hatred was the motivation of the Ministry and the enemies of 
Royalism; they were not to be associated with their claims 
to a better system.[22] 
Three weeks later, and in succeding articles, 
Chateaubriand b~gan to express his fears more concretely. 
Not only did the Ministry hate the Royalists, it was 
attempting to gain greater power by enlarging the franchise, 
bringing France to the edge of Democracy. A century and a 
half later, such a fear would seem to many to reveal only 
the worst of reactionary instincts. But to Chateaubriand, 
such an accusation carried the most serious of dangers, the 
fear of the mob dictating its harmful ambitions. 
) 
If there was any constructive argument which came out 
of Chateaubriand's articles in the Conservateur, it appeared 
21. Ibid., pp.40-41. 
22. Ibid., p.15. 
23. "De la Morale des _interets et de celle des devoirs, 11 
v.l, no.10, Dec., 1818, pp.466-78. 
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in December 1 1818.[21] Chateaubriand referred to it in his 
Memoirs as his most important contribution. The Ministry, 
he wrote, created a new morality, the morality of 
interests. Whereas the previous quarter-century staked its 
power on the loss of moral conscience and the spell of 
glory, the present Ministry based its claims on seduction. 
Nothing more dangerous could afflict France. "Duty" is what 
France was based on for fourteen centuries; the 
Eighteenth-century destroyed that, and now all motivation 
was based on "interest," which changed its nature whenever 
it was to its· immediate benefit. The morality of interests 
was anti-social, and that was what the children were now 
being taught. Only bad would come from their education in 
this life. 
There was a glory which Chateaubriand emphasized in 
the idea of Duty. lhe man who fulfilled his Duty in times of 
the greatest challenge would gain esteem; the nation which 
did so would gain its greatest glory. People did not fight 
for abstract ideas and gain anything, unless it wasout of 
sacrifice. The truth of ~ociety was not to be found outside 
of that sacred limit of Duty. And finally he offered his 
prophetic warning For those who would se~k to continue the 
policies of the present: "With this ~rofound policy, when 
the hour of devotion shall have come, each one will shut his 
door, go to the window, and watch the Monarchy pass."[24] 
24. Ibid. ,p.478. 
The argurnent he offered was his last really calm 
approach to the problems of the Restoration before the 
assassination of the Duke of Berry. Censorship of the press 
returned as the prirnary concern in most of his articles, and 
the attack on the Ministry remained the motif. There were 
some gems of journalistic propaganda in the articles; for 
instance, of the quality of the men now in government, he 
said, "These pygmies have stiffened their hold in order to 
support the colossal ruins under which they have been 
lodged."[25] But for the most part, Chateaubriand had 
entered into the Royalist camp and there seemed no return. 
The ministers, and his Liberal adversaries, probably would 
not have compromised with him anyway, having failed to read 
the moderation which he so wanted to guide the Restoration. 
But with his angry language, any cooperation was moribund. 
The Conservateur was in many ways the last effort the 
Royalists were able to sustain in the hopes of possibly 
transforming public opinion and Louis XVIII to their ways of 
thinking. They brought together conflicting personalities 
and opinions, and for much of the two years of publication 
the optimism that they would succeed in their efforts 
somehow managed to continue, even if it meant periodically 
offering the Ministry anolive branch.[26] And beyond 
politics, the journal offered colorful pieces on religion, 
25. "Politique,, 11 \/.J, no.27, pp.3-13, April, 1819. 
26. For example, "De la Liberti' de la Presse," v.5, no.54, 
Oct., 1819, p.71. 
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sustained an interest beyond the pessimism which was 
gradually encroaching on the political scene. 
One cannot read Chateaubriand's articles, however, 
without feeling the frustration which emerged increasingly 
in his attacks on the Ministry and the direction France was 
taking. His admonitions took on the aura of inevitable 
failure, even while France had the greatest opportunity to 
achieve the harmony, domestic and foreign, which he had 
sought since 1814: 
France, more than any other nation, is 
closer to strength, peace, and order than any 
nation in Europe. But within France, the . 
Ministerial system threatens this good state; the 
Ministry is trying to do away with."les honnAtes 
gens," and if it does, it will destroy the peace 
of E u r op e . [2 7] 
In one of his last articles, Chateaubriand predicted 
the downfall of the Decazes Ministry.[28] little could he 
have known that Louvel's dagger would fulfill that prophecy, 
but the shock of the act only reinforced the blame for 
France's political turmoil which had been placed on the 
Ministry all along. Of course, no such blame was really 
appropriate; the crime only confirmed what the Royalists had 
been saying for some time, that the policies of the 
27. "Politique," v.4-, no.47, August,1819, p.375. 
28. "Lettre sur Paris," v.6, no.68, Jan., 1820, p. 144. 
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government were bringing France to ruin. Many had been 
saying so for years, and their antagonistic attitudes toward 
their opponents only widened the gulf between them. 
• 
Epilogue 
Chateaubriand had tried to bring the factions 
together. Sincere if not naive, he had labored to reconcile 
almost impossible forces, and he himself, like the rest of 
France, had become a victim of them. After the murder of 
Berry, he gave up his politicl pen to seek his own 
ambitions, and ended up again, three years later, the great 
enemy of Ministerial government. Neither he alone, nor the 
Royalists, whose shouts of "Long live the King in spite of 
hi~self" betrayed their true feelings, brought down the 
reign of Charles X in 1830. 
If anything ~as inevitable in the Restoration, it was 
only that the loss of Monarchic rule, by no means guaranteed 
either in 1815, nor in 1820, would at least guarantee for 
France decades of political confusion and turmoil. By 
sealing the fate of the Bourbons, France itself would have 
to answer to its actions. As de Bertier has written: 
Who was the real loser - the nation, which 
at that hou~ [1830] thought it was victorious; or 
the obstinate old man who was leaving these shores 
for good! The Latter was giving up the most 
glorious throne of the finest kingdom in Europe; 
the former was depriving itself of a principle of 
political authority, of national unity, and of 
social stabiLit~, the equivalent of which it was 
never again able to recapture. After a hundred 
and thirty ~eaxs of revolutions and wars, of 
46 
dictatorial or anarchical governments, France can 
today estimate the irreparable seriousness of the 
wound which she inflicted upon herself by her 
eviction of Charles X, and she beholds with 
nostalgic envy her great neighbor across the 
Channel who had the wisdom to reconcile 
monarchical tradition with the inevitable 
democratic evolution.[l] 
47 
_Sadly, what Chateaubriand had urged, that France must learn 
to accept the new principle~ of political authority while 
appreciating the advantages of monarchy, was lost upon the 
men of the Restoration. He had foreseen the consequences of 
extremism and blind ambitions where many had refused to see 
them. If there is any consolation, all could now, 
ironically, see the wisdom of de Bertier's conclusion • 
• 
1. De Bertier, fhe Restoration, p. 456. 
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